The Evaluation of Charter School Impacts: Final Report
Gleason P, Clark M, Tuttle CC, Dwoyer E · 2010
grade Arctindependentreplicatednumbers spot-checked
Sample
2,904 consented applicants; 2,330 in the primary analysis sample (1,400 lottery winners / 930 losers); the Year-1/Year-2 achievement analysis uses 2,150 students across 29 sites. 36 charter middle schools in 15 states.
Population
Applicants to oversubscribed charter middle schools across 15 US states. Study schools were MORE advantaged than charter middle schools nationally (44% vs 62% FRPL-eligible, 47% vs 62% minority, 34% vs 49% below proficient in math), and applicants were more likely to be proficient than their neighbours (73% vs 57% reading).
Design
The national lottery-based evaluation (NCEE 2010-4029) — the only multi-state randomized charter study. An IES report with no DOI; the stable reference is the ERIC full text (ED510573). Only charter middle schools that were oversubscribed and held lotteries could be included, so results do not generalise to charter middle schools as a whole. Benjamini-Hochberg multiplicity correction within each outcome domain. IMPORTANT: the entire school-characteristics analysis (enrollment, ability grouping, urbanicity, revenue per student, hours) is explicitly CORRELATIONAL and exploratory — impacts are randomized, but the moderators are not, and the report says so in terms: "we could not determine whether the school characteristics themselves directly influenced charter school effectiveness."
Key findings
Nationally, the charter LABEL buys nothing on average — and the point estimates are consistently NEGATIVE (ITT -0.04 to -0.07 SD; TOT -0.06 to -0.09 SD; the report equates this to roughly a quarter-year less instruction), none surviving multiplicity correction, with worst-case attrition bounds running to -0.15/-0.21 and significant. Impacts vary enormously across sites (-0.78 to +0.65 SD in Year 2 math). The variation is strongly associated with intake: schools serving more disadvantaged or lower-achieving pupils show +0.18 and +0.12 SD in math, schools serving advantaged pupils -0.24 and -0.21. Two cautions the sector-average framing usually loses: the favourable half is MATH ONLY (reading is 0.00 for disadvantaged intakes), and the moderator analysis is correlational and exploratory, so "who the school serves and what model it runs" is a hypothesis generated by this study, not a causal finding of it. On resources specifically, revenue per student correlates with math impacts bivariately (p=0.034) but not after controls, and longer hours and lower student-teacher ratios likewise wash out. The one domain that moves large and robustly is satisfaction: parents rating the school excellent +33pp.
Genetic confound
Randomized admission; genes cannot differ between lottery winners and losers.
Replication notes
The heterogeneity pattern matches the Massachusetts urban/non-urban split, and the report itself cites Abdulkadiroglu 2009 and Hoxby 2009 as consistent. Note the study's own qualification — urbanicity stops being an influential factor once intake characteristics are controlled, so the replicated regularity is about WHO IS SERVED, not about cities.
Effects
| Outcome | Metric | Value | Measure | Timing | Vs | Horizon | Class |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reading achievement (state assessment z-score), average across sites | ITT SD | Year 1 -0.04 (p=0.214); Year 2 -0.07 (p=0.032 unadjusted, NOT significant after Benjamini-Hochberg). TOT -0.06 and -0.08. The average is a non-significant NEGATIVE, not a zero. | standardized | 1 and 2 years after the lottery | business-as-usual | 1-2yr | domain-skill |
| Math achievement (state assessment z-score), average across sites | ITT SD | Year 1 -0.06 (p=0.061); Year 2 -0.06 (p=0.136). TOT -0.09 and -0.08. The report notes effects of this size equal "approximately one-quarter of a year less instruction". | standardized | 1 and 2 years after the lottery | business-as-usual | 1-2yr | domain-skill |
| Attrition bounds on the average achievement impact (Appendix Table F.4) | ITT SD, bounded | lower bounds -0.15 to -0.21, ALL statistically significant after multiplicity adjustment; upper bounds +0.04 to +0.10, significant only for Year 1 reading. The null-average reading is not robust to worst-case attrition. | standardized | 1-2 years after the lottery | business-as-usual | 1-2yr | domain-skill |
| Site-level variation in impacts | ITT SD, per site | Year 2 reading ranged -0.43 to +0.33 across 28 sites (11 above zero, 17 below, 4 individually significant); Year 2 math ranged -0.78 to +0.65 (10 above zero, 18 below, 10 individually significant). Variation across sites is statistically significant. | standardized | 2 years after the lottery | business-as-usual | 1-2yr | domain-skill |
| Heterogeneity by intake — schools serving more vs fewer economically disadvantaged students | ITT SD, Year 2 | MATH: +0.18 (more disadvantaged intake) vs -0.24 (fewer), difference significant at .01. READING: 0.00 (more disadvantaged) vs -0.11 (fewer). The favourable half of this pattern is MATH ONLY — reading shows zero, not a gain, for disadvantaged intakes. | standardized | 2 years after the lottery | business-as-usual | 1-2yr | domain-skill |
| Heterogeneity by intake — schools serving lower vs higher baseline achievers | ITT SD, Year 2 | MATH: +0.12 (lower-achieving intake) vs -0.21 (higher-achieving). READING: +0.03 (lower-achieving, n.s.) vs -0.15 (higher-achieving). Both differences significant at .01. | standardized | 2 years after the lottery | business-as-usual | 1-2yr | domain-skill |
| Heterogeneity by urbanicity | ITT SD, Year 2 math | +0.16 in large urban areas vs -0.14 elsewhere, difference significant — BUT the urban/non-urban difference disappears once student and school characteristics are controlled. Urbanicity is a proxy for intake, not an independent driver. | standardized | 2 years after the lottery | business-as-usual | 1-2yr | domain-skill |
| Revenue per student as a moderator of charter impacts (the spending-relevant result) | correlation between site revenue/student and site impact | bivariate association with Year 2 math is positive and significant (coefficient 0.040, p=0.034), reading positive but not significant (0.028, p=0.056); the high- vs low-revenue subgroup difference is significant for math only. The association does NOT survive multivariate control for school and student characteristics. Mean charter revenue per student $8,066 (SD $2,336). Correlational within a randomized-impacts design. | administrative | 2 years after the lottery | business-as-usual | 1-2yr | domain-skill |
| Other resource/operations moderators — hours of operation, student-teacher ratio, teacher experience, autonomy, accountability, authorizer type, private management, school age | correlation with site impact | hours of operation and student-teacher ratio are significant in isolation but not after controlling for other school and student characteristics; autonomy, accountability, authorizer type, private management and school age show NO significant relationship at all (bivariate p-values 0.115-0.838). Only total enrollment (smaller = less negative, -0.06 SD per +100 pupils) and use of ability grouping in math survive all three analyses. | administrative | 2 years after the lottery | business-as-usual | 1-2yr | domain-skill |
| Attendance and grade promotion | ITT | days absent Year 1 -0.37 (p=0.301), Year 2 +0.22 (p=0.576); promoted to next grade 0.00 (Y1) and -0.01 (Y2), both n.s. — all null | administrative | 1-2 years after the lottery | business-as-usual | 1-2yr | attainment |
| Late to school 5 or more days | ITT, proportion | +0.05 (p=0.032 unadjusted; TOT +0.09, p=0.016) — UNFAVOURABLE to charters, does not survive multiplicity correction | administrative | first follow-up year | business-as-usual | under-1yr | behaviour |
| Discipline and behaviour (suspensions, sent out of class, parent-reported misbehaviour, good/bad behaviour indices) | ITT | null on every measure; suspensions +0.01 (Y1, p=0.559) and -0.01 (Y2, p=0.577) | mixed | first follow-up year | business-as-usual | under-1yr | behaviour |
| Student and parent satisfaction with school | ITT | large and significant after multiplicity correction — parent rates school excellent +33pp (0.70 vs 0.37); parent satisfaction index +0.28 (ES 0.71); student likes school a lot +12pp; student feelings-about-school index +0.13 (ES 0.29); parent-perceived problems -0.18 (ES -0.35). This is the study's only consistently positive domain. | self-report | first follow-up year | business-as-usual | under-1yr | non-cognitive |
| Parent-reported child adjustment / well-being | ITT | +0.08 (ES 0.22, p=0.001, survives multiplicity correction); college expectations, extracurricular index and parent concerns all null | self-report | first follow-up year | business-as-usual | under-1yr | non-cognitive |
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